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Staging Resistance in Bil‘in
The Performance of Violence in a Palestinian Village
Rania Jawad
On 17 June 2011, young actors of the Freedom Theatre, based in the Jenin Refugee Camp, 
gathered together in the Palestinian village of Bil‘in as if in celebration.1 The rhythm of drums, 
horns, and traditional Palestinian dance set the scene. The actors staged a short sketch on the 
dirt road leading to the village’s agricultural fields. The moment the act ended and the actors 
began to step away, the stage area of their performance was hit by tear gas canisters. The rhyth­
mic sounds were replaced by an Israeli barrage of rubber bullets, tear gas, and sewage water; 
spectators came armed with hospital masks and cameras. The spectacle of celebration, perfor­
mance, and violence are all part of a protest campaign enacted weekly in Bil‘in since 2005.
The ways in which art and politics are represented contributes to how they are under­
stood and practiced. By reading them together, or more specifically, by investigating the politics 
behind artistic stagings and framings of political actions, the role of spectatorship becomes key. 
 1. For a short video of the event, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDdtr_HQzFQ&feature=player_embedded 
(YouTube.com 2011).
Staging R
esistance in B
il‘in
129
 2. Following the unilateral declaration of the Israeli state by Zionist leaders in May 1948 on the land of Palestine, 
the 1949 Armistice Line is referred to as the Green Line. It separates Israel from the surrounding Arab countries 
and the territories that were subsequently militarily occupied (currently including the Palestinian territories of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Syrian Golan Heights).
 3. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), approximately 
62 percent of the Wall was completed as of July 2010, and the intended route is to be more than twice the length 
of the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank.
 4. The International Court of Justice’s ruling was endorsed by the UN General Assembly, which subsequently issued 
a resolution calling on Israel to comply with its findings.
A discourse of nonviolence and a highly visible theatricality have framed the Palestinian village 
of Bil‘in and its residents’ struggle against the Israeli confiscation of their lands. Analyzing two 
dominant ways of categorizing Bil‘in’s weekly protest actions — theatrical and discursive —  
reveals how both serve as underlying strategies in the villagers’ performance of resistance. As 
warranted by the strategies employed, the politics of resistance in the Palestinian context, which 
has been enacted more recently in terms of locality, cannot be detached from the larger anti­
colonial, national struggle. While navigating different audiences, such a politics of performance 
in the public sphere is one predicated on violence, whether through the use of violent meth­
ods in order to suppress dissent or the use of symbolic violence in order to expose and counter 
oppression. What becomes apparent is how spectatorship is mobilized in different ways, reveal­
ing the various politics behind the performance of both violence and resistance.
Located 12 kilometers west of the city of Ramallah and 4 kilometers outside of the Green 
Line (the 1949 armistice line that demarcates the state of Israel),2 Bil‘in is an agricultural vil­
lage spanning around 4,000 dunams (980 acres) with a population of approximately 1,800 resi­
dents, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Since the 1980s, approximately 
55 percent of Bil‘in’s agricultural land has been declared “state land” by Israel and confiscated 
for the construction of the Modi’in Illit settlement bloc. In early 2005, Israel began construc­
tion on a separation wall — or “Apartheid Wall,” as it’s known — on Bil‘in’s land, in effect cut­
ting the village in half in order to put Modi’in Illit on the Israeli side of the Wall. The Wall, 
which Israel began building in 2002 in the West Bank, and in and around East Jerusalem, is 
planned to extend over 700 kilometers in length, less than 20 percent following the path of the 
Green Line — de facto annexing over 12 percent of the land in the West Bank and Jerusalem.3 
If, in addition to the Wall, we also take into account the settlements and their settler road infra­
structure, the Israeli land confiscation policy will effectively prevent Palestinians from gain­
ing access to 46 percent of the West Bank (see Stop the Wall and Addameer 2009). I will not 
go into more detail about the Wall itself, however I should note that the devastating impact it 
has had on the Palestinian population, its lands, livelihood, mobility, infrastructure, and econ­
omy has been documented by numerous international organizations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, and the International Court of Justice, which in its advisory ruling of July 2004 effec­
tively declared the Wall’s construction within occupied Palestinian territory illegal (see Stop the 
Wall and Addameer 2009; OCHA 2009; International Court of Justice 2004).4
Figure 1. (facing page) Actors of The Freedom Theatre, based in the Jenin refugee camp, participate in a 
Bil‘in demonstration, 17 June 2011. (Photo by Anne Paq/activestills.org)
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 5. In areas impacted by the Wall, popular committees comprised of activists from the affected communities 
have been formed. Their actions are supported and sometimes coordinated by an umbrella organization, the 
Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall). According to the 2009 report co-authored 
by the Stop the Wall Campaign and Addameer, popular committees started to focus on Israeli settlement and 
settlement infrastructure, in addition to the construction of the Wall, “in recognition of the fact that the two 
colonial construction efforts are two sides of the same coin, which leaves Palestinians dispossessed and living in 
walled-in ghettoes and enclaves” (2009:24).
 6. The report is a 108-page research document that draws on a variety of sources to confirm its data, including UN 
and official governmental publications, nongovernmental research-based websites, journalistic and scholarly writ-
ing, in addition to personal interviews. For information on the Stop the Wall campaign, see http://stopthewall 
.org/news/1.shtml. For information on Addameer, see www.addameer.org/addameer/about.html.
In direct response to the illegal confiscation of their lands, residents of Bil‘in began organiz­
ing daily direct actions in protest and formed what is now called the Bil‘in Popular Committee 
Against the Wall and Settlements.5 More than six years later, the Popular Committee continues 
its protest campaign, now holding public action demonstrations every Friday. In a report over 
100 pages long, jointly issued in July 2009 by the Palestinian Grassroots Anti­Apartheid Wall 
Campaign and Addameer (the Prisoners Support and Human Rights Association), these actions 
of Bil‘in and other affected Palestinian villages are described as “one of the few forms of civil 
resistance to the occupation that is left in the occupied Palestinian territories” (2009:12).6 The 
report also notes that the popular protest movement was, from its beginning, not only directed 
towards obstructing further implementation of Israel’s colonization policies, but was also a 
strong critic of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and its governing institutions for not 
supporting the popular resistance struggle.
As evidenced in general across the occupied Palestinian territories, every area threatened 
with demolitions or land confiscation becomes a point of confrontation where local Palestinian 
residents are resisting Israeli state actions. Spontaneous and organized protests in the West 
Bank specifically against construction of the Wall in 2002 and 2003 began in the northern vil­
lages of Qalqiliya and Jenin, emerging also in Jayyous and in villages in the Salfit district. Since 
then, protests including the strategy of weekly Friday demonstrations continue in a num­
ber of villages and in areas of East Jerusalem, such as Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah, under threat 
of Israeli settlement expansion and demolition of Palestinian homes. In an article discussing 
Israeli “enclavization” of Palestinian territory as the new imposed status quo, Lisa Taraki notes 
the emergence of “more local manifestations of resistance, organizing, and activism” as a result 
of Israel’s spatial or closure regime (2008:7). “The spatial dismemberment of Palestinian soci­
ety,” she writes, “has contributed to the fragmentation of political action,” whereby nation­level 
politics of resistance have given way to more localized forms (2008:7). What I want to note, 
however, is that the localization of resistance strategies has not restricted either the goals or 
the actors of these campaigns to the localized Palestinian sphere. In other words, the goals of 
the demonstrations against the Wall are nearly always linked to the larger frame of defending 
Palestinian land and rights to self­determination, in effect protesting Israel’s destructive poli­
cies against the Palestinian population at large. Additionally, the actors involved in the actions, 
while headed and mobilized by local villagers, are now joined by international and Israeli soli­
darity activists.
Discursive Framings
What tends to mark Bil‘in in comparison to other affected villages is both the highly visi­
ble non­Palestinian presence that at times dominates the local presence in their Friday dem­
onstrations, and their highly deliberate theatrical staging, which itself has captured both local 
and international media attention. In a 2009 article in the New York Times, for instance, Bil‘in’s 
Friday demonstrations are described as “one of the longest­running and best organized pro­
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test operations in the history of the Israeli­Palestinian conflict, [...turning] this once anonymous 
farming village into a symbol of Palestinian civil disobedience, a model that many supporters 
of the Palestinian cause would like to see spread and prosper” (Bronner 2009). This articula­
tion, situated within a discourse of nonviolent resistance, is representative of how most inter­
nationals, whether individuals or organizations, categorize Bil‘in’s weekly demonstrations. The 
author’s choice of the words “operation,” directly positing the protests against the violence of 
the suicide operation, and “civil disobedience” firmly locate this perspective. The actions are 
applauded for enabling supporters within the international community to describe the resis­
tance under the rubric of “nonviolent,” and the protests are packaged as the “good” model of 
resistance that needs to spread. 
Not only do international journalists and organizations such as the International Solidarity 
Movement (ISM), and Christian­affiliated organizations such as the American Friends Service 
Committee, praise and encourage the “nonviolent” nature of Bil‘in’s resistance, but so do polit­
ical figures such as Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, former US President Jimmy 
Carter, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. In our contemporary context where mainstream media 
and mediations dominate how we perceive “other” cultures, the focus on what is articulated 
as “nonviolent” in Palestine ultimately, even if implicitly, directs the spectator to read the cul­
ture as predominantly violent. When situated historically in the Palestinian struggle, such 
a discourse functions not only to delegitimize other forms of Palestinian resistance against 
Israeli policies, but also serves to endorse an ideological perspective that tends to posit what is 
described as violent on the side of individuals engaged in resistance acts and not on the actions 
and institutions of the state. The larger frame of why various resistance strategies are used is 
elided. We can see this clearly in US President Obama’s 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt, where 
his usage of violence and extremism was nearly exclusively reserved for individuals, not states 
or institutions. “Palestinians must abandon violence,” he said, “resistance through violence and 
killing is wrong and does not succeed” (Whitehouse.gov 2009). In an article questioning why 
figures such as Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr. are celebrated as modern­day icons whereas 
figures such as Malcolm X and Crazy Horse are kept underground, Ramzy Baroud redirects 
this discourse by asking, “where is the call for Israel to embrace non­violence?” Following the 
2008–2009 massive and bloody onslaught on Gaza, he writes, “Would the media and the world 
community press the Israelis to embrace non­violence, had they endured such atrocities such as 
those witnessed in Gaza?” (2009).
An underlying basis of Bil‘in’s resistance strategy is such appropriation and redirection of 
the other, or more specifically, the colonizer’s tools. A leaflet printed in July 2009 by the Bil‘in 
Popular Committee and left near the Wall for the Israeli soldiers, reads: 
We, the people of Bil‘in, know that you have practiced all sorts of oppression against 
us and against our rights. [...] For several weeks now, you have let none of us sleep. [...] 
Intimidating children and sick people constitutes collective punishment on a civilian pop­
ulation. These kinds of actions have a name: terror. Why do you hide your faces? [...] Get 
rid of the masks [...] you cannot hide the truth [...] that by raiding the village and depriv­
ing the entire village from sleep for weeks, you are acting as terrorists. (Bilin­village 
.org 2009)
In their language, the Popular Committee redirects the categorization of terror and terrorist 
away from the Palestinian villagers and toward the Israeli soldiers, thus reversing a dominant 
discourse that is used against them. What they also do is redirect such common attendant sig­
nifiers of the Palestinian “terrorist” such as the mask and the individual actor as separate from 
a state apparatus — the soldiers are not named as hidden functionaries of the state but rather as 
individuals who knock down their doors at night.
In a similar fashion, the Bil‘in Popular Committee has appropriated the discourse of non­
violence to describe their struggle. In the information they distribute, whether in pamphlets, 
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listserv announcements and reports, or when they speak to the media or individual visitors, they 
name their struggle as “popular” and “nonviolent.” The first descriptor we can say is largely 
directed inward toward the Palestinian population — “popular” as representative of the  people 
and not a corrupt or impotent leadership. The latter descriptor is largely directed outward 
toward an international audience — “nonviolent” as morally superior, not intended to cause 
pain or death to the other, and in contrast to armed resistance. We can understand the Popular 
Committee’s use of a discourse of nonviolence as an appropriation: first, because such terminol­
ogy was not historically used at either the level of leadership or more popular level in Palestine; 
and second, because of the conscious and deliberate incorporation of such terminology as 
attractive to an international palate. What is categorized as “nonviolent” is in no way an end in 
and of itself for the villagers. While the emphasis from the international community is placed 
on the “nonviolent” tactics and not necessarily on the signification of the larger struggle itself 
(to free Palestine from colonial rule), the villagers’ eyes are intently focused on the larger goal. 
The appropriation of a discourse of nonviolence is thus clearly a strategy. There is no applause 
following a demonstration because it succeeded in its “nonviolence”; rather, participants do 
cheer when a young unarmed Palestinian villager succeeds in picking up a tear gas canister, one 
of many that are thrown each Friday at the demonstrators, and manages to throw it back at the 
fully armed Israeli soldiers.
Theatrical Strategies
The appropriation of the colonizer’s tools of suppression (whether literal, such as the tear gas 
canister, or more symbolic, such as the marking of the other as terrorist) is a recurring compo­
nent of Bil‘in’s theatrical staging. Each demonstration is intended to be unique in its confron­
Figure 2. Residents of Bil‘in protesting Israeli confiscation of their lands in 2005. Bassem Abu Rahme (center, 
in yellow) was shot and killed by Israeli soldiers in 2009 when a high-velocity tear gas projectile was fired at 
his chest. (Photo by Friends of Freedom and Justice — Bil‘in)
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 7. On 17 April 2009, Bil‘in resident Bassem Abu Rahme was shot and killed by Israeli soldiers when a high- velocity 
tear gas projectile was fired at his chest. On 31 December 2010, his sister Jawaher Abu Rahme was killed by tear 
gas inhalation leading to acute respiratory failure. In addition, numerous Palestinian villagers and a number of 
foreign activists have been injured during the weekly Friday protest demonstrations, some very seriously, causing 
long-term injuries. 
tation with the Israeli army, and is often based on the strategy of making visible Israeli violence 
on the Palestinian population as a whole. The typical version of the Friday demonstration con­
sists of a protest march, following the midday prayer, from the mosque in the village to the 
Wall, a distance of a few kilometers. As the demonstrators near the Wall, they are met by Israeli 
soldiers lobbing high­velocity tear gas canisters, sound bombs, rubber­coated steel bullets, 
and at times firing 0.22 caliber live ammunition at them.7 The confrontation is a ritual played 
out with such consistency and deliberation that one cannot but note the performance on both 
sides — the spectacle of demonstrators not merely staging their protest but actively and effec­
tively documenting themselves and the sol­
diers’ response, on one side, and what has 
been described as the “spectacular violence” 
of the Israeli soldiers’ response, on the other 
(Stop the Wall and Addameer 2009:5).
Groups of foreigners ranging from a 
Basque nationalist music group to the Peace 
Cycle, a group of 120 cyclists from around 
the world, to a radical Belgium choral group 
have been invited to participate in the dem­
onstrations, mimicking the political tour­
ism of the Israeli state. While such figures as 
UN officials and US President Obama are 
taken by Israeli state officials to Yad Vashem, 
the official Israeli memorial and educa­
tional center on the Holocaust, and Sderot, 
the Israeli town north of the Gaza Strip, the 
Bil‘in Popular Committee invites and encour­
ages internationals not only to physically wit­
ness the “spectacular” confrontation, but also 
to take part in the resistance performance. 
Eyad Burnat, head of the Bil‘in Popular Committee, describes the strategy of the Friday dem­
onstrations largely within the context of a media war: the people of Bil‘in are not only resisting 
the construction of the physical Wall on our lands, he argues, but are involved in a media war 
against the dominant discourse and circulation of the Zionist narrative, past and present (2009). 
In order to equip themselves for the media front of the struggle, distinct media strategies were 
pursued, with Committee members working intensively to develop international contacts and 
media coverage. The theatricality of Bil‘in’s actions plays a vital role on this front. 
In direct response to the first bulldozers arriving on their lands in February 2005, villagers 
chained themselves to their olive trees, declaring that the soldiers would have to uproot them 
along with the trees — uprooting the olive trees that have come to symbolize Palestine and its 
history with the land would mean also physically uprooting the Palestinians themselves. The 
simple symbolic act, in effect, embodied a root Zionist tactic, the ethnic cleansing of the indig­
enous Palestinian population starting in 1948 and continuing until today. In another action, vil­
lagers locked themselves inside an iron cage, imprisoning themselves as a visible manifestation 
of what the Wall and Israel’s closure regime is doing to all of the occupied Palestinian territo­
ries. In the same way that their action forced the soldiers to unchain them from the olive trees, 
Figure 3. Their faces covered against the tear gas, 
two foreign solidarity activists participate in a 
Friday demonstration in Bil‘in in 2009. One 
woman wears goggles and holds pieces of onion to 
protect herself from the burn of the gas. (Photo by 
Rania Jawad)
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this action forced the soldiers 
to release them from the prison 
cage. In a recent action mark­
ing the 20th anniversary of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, villagers 
carried a 12­meter polystyrene 
Wall at the head of the Friday 
demonstration, displaying the 
words “Berlin 1989, Palestine ?” 
Placing the construction directly 
at the foot of the Israeli­built 
Wall, the villagers indirectly 
forced the soldiers to tear down 
and destroy the polystyrene 
Wall. Each act, while symbolic, 
manifests itself literally as a 
micro­version of Israeli tactics of 
systematic violence against the 
Palestinian population, and as a 
representation of the villagers’ goal. The villagers have, in effect, directed the soldiers’ actions 
toward that goal. They have written the script and staged the action, directing all the actors 
present, including those resisting the Wall as well as the Israeli soldiers. 
Another action that mimicked Israeli colonization policies was the building of what the 
Popular Committee termed “the first Palestinian outpost,” modeled on Zionist and Israeli out­
posts that are built prior to the establishment of settlements on confiscated Palestinian lands. 
Constructed on the side of the Wall where the Israeli settlement extension Mattiyahu Mizrah is 
situated, the outpost was destroyed within hours by the Israeli army. Unable to argue the ille­
gality of the Palestinian outpost without also admitting the illegality of the Mattiyahu Mizrah 
settlement, which at that time had not obtained approval from the Israeli military government 
in the West Bank for its construction, the soldier argued that the Palestinian outpost did not 
adhere to Israeli construction standards. The villagers quickly realized the unintended directive 
in the soldier’s words and returned to build a more solid structure with a cement roof and win­
dows. In adherence with Israeli construction standards, the room remains standing.
The ways in which both the politics of the colonizing state and the resistance of the colo­
nized are performed during these actions is tied to violence, whether by the use of violent tac­
tics to suppress dissent or by the representation of violence itself. The violence of the Israeli 
state toward the Palestinian population is described in the 2009 report on the Wall as “system­
atic and premeditated, [...] tactically intended to create a highly visible spectacle, rendering vic­
tims as examples” (Stop the Wall and Addameer 2009:5). The use of violence can therefore be 
understood as strategic, making visible the power and control of the Israeli state and occupa­
tion army, intended as both an immediate and potential threat. The construction of the Wall is 
a visible manifestation of the larger regime of Israeli state violence, including the enclavization 
of Palestinian communities, the destruction of agricultural land and livelihood, and the control 
and surveillance of Palestinian movement. The theatrical machinery behind such a regime has 
played a significant role in how Israeli state policies have been read by an international, and par­
ticularly Western, audience.
The early Zionist and later Israeli discourse and imaging of the land of Palestine that was 
predicated on the absence of any native inhabitants has been translated into Israeli state practice 
based on the physical displacement of the Palestinian indigenous population. Realized either by 
a continuous process of ethnic cleansing (marked by the 1948 Nakba, “catastrophe” in Arabic, 
and ongoing today), or enacted by a policy of separation and enclavization that quite literally 
places (or displaces) Palestinian communities out of sight, the strategy of absenting has been 
Figure 4. Tear gas thrown by Israeli soldiers at protestors destroys the fertile lands 
of Bil‘in, especially the olive trees, a source of livelihood for village residents. 
(Photo by Friends of Freedom and Justice — Bil‘in)
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 8. To view the original Cellcom commercial advertisement and a few parodies made in response, see www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=AH02uc1vB4k&feature=player_embedded# and www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx 
?ID=214301.
complimented by the marking of the Palestinian as “Other,” and specifically as violent “Other” 
(see Said [1979] 1992; Sa’di and Abu­Lughod 2007; Pappe 2007). It is significant that the pro­
cess of Othering Palestinians is not merely in reference to Jews but also to the land of Palestine 
and its history. Such marking of the Palestinian collective body serves as a “form of symbolic 
violence,” to use the words of Craig Owens, “in order both to assign it to a place and to keep it 
in place,” as well as a process that Ammiel Alcalay, borrowing from Erica Hunt (1990), describes 
as one that will “abbreviate the human” (Owens 1994:194; Alcalay 1993:20). The process of 
categorizing people, Alcalay writes, is employed “in order to dilute their impact on changing 
accepted structures of power [...] ultimately [...] diminish[ing] human potential and agency in 
the world” (1993:20). Such strategies of representation and framing what gets seen and what 
gets left out are mechanics of 
theatricality that are directed not 
only outward to an international 
audience, but also locally, largely 
targeting the Jewish­Israeli citi­
zens of the state.
In the summer of 2009, 
a commercial for the Israeli 
mobile company Cellcom was 
aired showing the response 
of a group of Israeli soldiers 
upon encountering a soccer 
ball kicked over a long stretch 
of the Wall.8 What emerges is 
an improvised game of soccer 
where the armed occupation sol­
diers who are patrolling along­
side the Wall in a military jeep 
are transformed into a playful 
team of competitors enlivened 
by a game of sport. The perfor­
mance is complete with a musi­
cal soundtrack and an audience 
of cheering spectators comprised of female and male soldiers. What is absent from view is not 
merely the Palestinian “team” on the other side of the Wall, but the role of the Wall itself in the 
performance. While its role in the commercial is what enables the lively soccer match to ensue, 
implying a friendly match between two sides, the role of the Wall in actuality as constructed 
by the Israeli state performs a violent act of separation and displacement. The colonial context 
falls away and the Wall is transformed from a colonial signifier into a tool for sport, offering 
pleasure to both actors and spectators. The commercial recasts the props of military occupa­
tion — armed soldiers, military jeeps, and concrete Wall — in effect, recasting colonial violence 
into playful sport that is performed with the implicit willingness of the other side. 
Just as the Bil‘in villagers employ a strategy of recasting the Israeli occupation as violent, 
Israel has used diverse media strategies to re­present its colonial violence. The Wall has there­
fore become a site for staging the occupation for both Israelis and Palestinians, literally and 
symbolically. For Palestinians, the protest demonstrations against the Wall in villages such as 
Bil‘in have become an event symbolizing Palestinian resistance for a number of different actors. 
Figure 5. Bil‘in protestors build a “Palestinian outpost” (foreground) to show 
Israel’s double standards toward its Jewish citizens and Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories. In the background is the Israeli settlement built on Bil‘in’s 
lands. (Photo by Friends of Freedom and Justice — Bil‘in)
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 9. Of the more radical political participants is the Israeli group Anarchists Against the Wall, a major supporter of 
the Palestinian villages’ protests against the Wall, whose members participate in Bil‘in’s protest actions (www 
.awalls.org). Another example is Shministim, an Israeli organization of teenagers who refuse to serve in the army, 
whose members were invited to join Bil‘in’s Friday demonstration in October 2009.
10. For a visual documentary of many of Bil‘in’s theatrical protest actions, see the 2006 documentary film by Shai 
Carmeli Pollak titled Bil‘in Habibti.
The performance of resistance at these sites takes on different meanings when enacted by local 
villagers, Palestinian political figures, international solidarity activists, and Jewish­Israeli activ­
ists. While local villagers are protesting the direct impact on their lives and the larger violence 
on the land and the Palestinian population as a whole, Palestinian political figures declare their 
support for the resistance by their physical presence at the demonstrations. These figures are 
often critiqued for appropriating the performance of the villagers for their own personal inter­
ests, paying lip service to resistance actions yet pursuing normalizing relations with the Israeli 
state. Foreign solidarity activists, while not a homogeneous group in either their intent or polit­
ical vision, are markers in the demonstration of an international presence, not only witnessing 
the event but present in order to be seen. A reduced level of violence against the protestors has 
been documented when internationals are present, in effect, offering evidence of Israel’s racial 
politics where a Palestinian body is worth less than a non­Palestinian body. For Jewish­Israeli 
activists, these villages become places to exercise their activism and critique their state’s pol­
icies. Also targeted during the Israeli soldiers’ confrontation with the demonstrators, Jewish­
Israeli activists, however, can easily fall into the role of serving a discourse of Israeli democracy 
and free expression. One Jewish­Israeli activist, echoing others, comments that he “does not 
consider his actions unpatriotic. By demonstrating in Bil‘in, he said, he was guarding Israeli 
democracy” (in Guarnieri 2009). 
Diverse in their ideological 
beliefs, Jewish­Israeli activists 
and internationals in Bil‘in com­
plicate any single representation 
of solidarity.9 
Being present at a Bil‘in dem­
onstration blurs any fine line 
between participant and witness. 
Anyone present at the dem­
on stration becomes a partici­
pant and is seen as such by the 
Israeli soldiers. Not only has 
the act of witnessing the dem­
onstration become a fundamen­
tal element of the protest action 
itself, but one’s presence there 
becomes politicized. There is no 
outside from which to “objec­
tively” observe the confronta­
tion that ritually takes place. 
Spectatorship is further mobi­
lized by the villagers as each resistance action is self­documented, circulated via media technol­
ogies such as YouTube clips and weekly email reports, and archived on the Bil‘in website and 
in documentary film.10 Additionally, video footage and still photography serve as evidence in 
court trials to contradict Israeli charges against protestors and villagers. However, such archi­
val evidence does not guarantee that it will either be read as proof or be accepted as evidence 
Figure 6. An Associated Press journalist following a Friday 
demonstration in Bil‘in in 2009. (Photo by Rania Jawad)
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11. In March 2010 the Israeli army raided the village, declaring it (and Ni‘lin, another West Bank Palestinian village) 
a closed military zone for the next five months. According to the military order posted in the village, all inter-
national and Israeli activists found on Bil‘in land between its residential area and the Wall between the hours of 
8:00 am and 8:00 pm any Friday are threatened with deportation or arrest.
in favor of the accused. Israel has targeted participants in the demonstrations, whether protes­
tors or media personnel, for contributing to a visual archive of the villagers’ resistance and the 
army’s response. The strategy of visually witnessing and archiving these confrontations is not 
limited to the demonstrators; it also serves as part of the infrastructure of the Israeli occupation. 
Palestinian villagers are subject to arrest, travel restrictions, destruction of property, and physi­
cal violence because of their visible participation in such resistance actions, while international 
and Israeli activists are penalized for their very presence in Bil‘in.11 The Israeli army, along with 
the solidarity activists and press media, form part of the media machinery of Bil‘in, where the 
Israeli soldier, the Bil‘in villager, the solidarity activist, and press personnel who are armed with 
video recorder or still camera play a similar role as participants in the actions. Each documents 
the grassroots public protest 
against Israeli policies and the 
tactics by the state used to sup­
press such resistance. For what 
purposes such documentation is 
used or not used reveals a poli­
tics behind the form of specta­
torship enacted.
Re-staging Objects and 
Spectatorship 
A central performance strat­
egy of Bil‘in’s Friday demon­
strations is thus making visible 
how the resistance to violence 
is continually met with vio­
lence. In addition to the media 
archive that is created, the pro­
duction of objects formed out of 
or as part of the demonstrations 
themselves is another element 
that underscores the relationship 
between the visual and the polit­
ical. Ibrahim Burnat, a resident 
of Bil‘in, has built a collection 
of artworks to visualize and doc­
ument this recurring dynamic. 
Constructed largely out of his 
collection of the ammunition 
Israeli soldiers fire at the Friday 
demonstrators (comprised of 
thousands of rubber­coated and 
live bullets, tear gas  canisters, 
and sound grenades, among 
other forms of munitions), 
Burnat titles his art collection 
Figure 7. An art piece by Bil‘in resident Ibrahim Burnat 
(bornat_83@hotmail.com) constructed out of used ammunition 
fired by Israeli soldiers at protestors in Bil‘in. (Photo by 
Rania Jawad)
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An Exhibition of Palestinian Heritage: The Palestinian Exhibition for Documenting the Crimes of the 
Occupation. One art piece shows the map of Palestine outlined with rubber­coated bullets that 
are surrounded by an outer wall of light­gray, empty tear gas canisters. Inside the map, empty 
shells of ammunition uniformly litter the landscape. While inscribing the map of Palestine has 
itself been configured as a symbol of Palestinian national resistance to colonization, just as the 
exhibition of Palestinian heritage itself, the use of ammunition to create the map complicates 
the picture. The ammunition is not used to demarcate the various walls that Israel continues to 
build inside Palestine, but instead is used to draw the map itself while also constructing a wall 
that both circumscribes and protects the map. The outer wall of tear gas canisters lined upright 
next to each other subtly mimics the gray concrete slabs of the Apartheid Wall, raised high yet 
penetrable. By using the very tools that are intended to fight and wound him as the raw mate­
rial of his artwork, Burnat’s representational imagery comes to symbolize the violence that is 
directed toward the Palestinian nation, in effect visualizing the heritage Palestinians have been 
forced to live for more than 60 years.
The catastrophe of 1948, the Nakba for Palestinians, in which more than half of the 
Palestinian population (nearly 800,000 people) was dispossessed, over 500 villages destroyed, 
and the land either militarily occupied by Israel or placed under foreign jurisdiction, is a legacy 
that continues to be tangibly felt (see Sa’di and Abu­Lughod 2007; Pappe 2007; Smith 2007). 
Burnat’s exhibition of Palestinian heritage thus offers one visual articulation of what the ongo­
ing condition of the Nakba represents for Palestinians. Israel’s violence against the Palestinians 
does not have an immediate end but remains a constant presence, just as the shells of the sol­
diers’ ammunition fired at the village demonstrators becomes a constant residue on the village 
landscape. In one Friday demonstration in Bil‘in in September 2009 during the olive harvest 
season, villagers, unable to access their land to pick their olives, distributed sacks for an alter­
native harvest. The shells of tear gas canisters were gathered, replacing the olive harvest’s sym­
bol of Palestinian livelihood and connection to the land with one of military occupation. Such 
visual representations of Israeli violence and Palestinian resistance, while serving as a form 
of documentation of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, are another theatrical element in 
Bil‘in’s performances.
The literal juxtaposition of art and violence in Burnat’s exhibition breaks any strict dichot­
omy between the two in the same way that the performance of Bil‘in’s demonstrations defies 
the distinct separation between theatre and resistance action. How art, violence, and politi­
cal struggle are represented emphasizes not only the intended aim of its producers, but also 
how they are read and interpreted. In March 2006, an exhibition titled Fence Art, curated by 
Oded Yedaya, opened in a Tel Aviv art gallery (see Roei 2007). The sculptural objects on show 
included rusted L­shaped pipes, a locked iron cage, and a large viper made of cloth. Each object 
was brought from Bil‘in, a theatrical prop that had been used during the demonstrations against 
the Wall. While a small side space in the gallery offered a visual and written contextualiza­
tion of the objects, the objects themselves were alienated in the white cube space of the gallery, 
stripped of their functional, symbolic, and political meanings. The title of the exhibition func­
tioned in a similar manner, reconfiguring the political into the aesthetic, the Wall into a fence. 
The staging of these objects within the walls of an art gallery and under the title of an art exhi­
bition where spectators are invited to examine them from a safe distance frames how the objects 
are to be read. While in both contexts the value of the objects is predicated on them being seen, 
the temporal and spatial displacement from the protest demonstration on Bil‘in land to the 
static space of the Tel Aviv gallery disrupts any stability of meaning. 
The Israeli soldiers’ encounter with these objects differs on a number of levels from that 
of the Jewish­Israeli gallery visitor. The soldier’s encounter is within a context of direct con­
frontation, while that of the gallery visitor is one of visual consumption. The removal of the 
Palestinians from the objects in the gallery space creates an alternate dynamic of power between 
object and Jewish­Israeli subject. Detached from their producers and housed within the con­
trolled and contained space of the Israeli gallery, the objects are unarmed, the purpose of their 
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12. For more information on the Palestinian call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions, see www.pacbi.org/etemplate 
.php?id=868 and www.bdsmovement.net. 
production deactivated. Cloaked as abstract, sculptural forms within the white walls of the gal­
lery space, the objects are intended to provoke spectatorship and, according to the Israeli 
curator, discussions around “the notion of ‘political art’” (Roei 2007:18). While potentially 
attracting an audience otherwise disengaged from Palestinian protest actions, transfiguring 
Bil‘in’s political struggle into “political art” ultimately functions to assure and situate the gallery 
spectator in a position of power. The objects are now under surveillance and judged according 
to the spectator’s criteria, no longer a weapon in a performance of resistance under the direc­
tion of Palestinian villagers. 
The transformation and appropriation of Palestinian artifacts by discursive strategy or Israeli 
political policy is a recurring phenomenon. The reclassification of Palestinian local industries 
into Israeli products for distribution and the appropriation of Palestinian property for Jewish 
citizens following the 1948 Nakba are two early examples in Israel’s history. The Palestinian vil­
lage of Ein Houd is another where “an aesthetic veneer” was employed to recast the remnants 
of the exiled Palestinian community into works of art, traces of an anonymous, primitive past 
(Slyomovics 1998:35). A colony of Jewish artists now stands in its place, the Palestinian stone 
architecture embedded into the Israeli residences. Stripping the Palestinian houses of their 
owners echoes the transference of Bil‘in objects to Tel Aviv, highlighting not only a mobility 
largely denied the Bil‘in villagers, but a space where the Jewish spectator gives meaning to the 
objects. The restaging of Bil‘in objects of protest in the Tel Aviv gallery resonates with Burnat’s 
restaging of the Israeli army’s objects of attack. Burnat describes the appropriation of Israeli 
munitions into artwork as an ability to create life out of instruments of death (in Jamjoum 
2008). The performance of Bil‘in’s resistance thus challenges how meaning is ascribed to both 
objects and practices.
How spectatorship is mobilized in Bil‘in is largely based on such a process of reassigning 
meaning to object and practice, how each is read and enacted. At the end of the 2009 report on 
the Wall is a call to various spectators of Bil‘in’s struggle to take responsibility in supporting 
Palestinian grassroots resistance. Addressed to the United Nations, signatories to the Geneva 
Conventions, Palestinian and international NGOs working in the occupied Palestinian territo­
ries, international solidarity groups, and local and international media, the report connects the 
role of spectatorship with the act of holding Israel accountable for its violations of international 
law (see Stop the Wall and Addameer 2009; Falk 2002). Not taking such responsibility is not 
considered mere indifference but rather complicity in maintaining the status quo, thus contrib­
uting to Israeli human rights violations and denial of Palestinian self­determination. The pres­
ence of international solidarity activists in Bil‘in’s demonstrations, while articulating a particular 
role for foreign nationals in the Palestinian resistance struggle, at the same time points to the 
role of international complicity and direct support of Israeli policies. The role of the interna­
tional community, according to the recommendations, is therefore not ultimately based on a 
spectatorship defined by the witnessing and documentation of violations of international law, 
but rather on sustained and specific direct actions in the fields of law, governmental and eco­
nomic politics, media, institutional, and grassroots activism. The performance of the Palestinian 
villagers resistance actions thus depends on a spectatorship that transforms itself into action. 
The spectator’s role is to continue the performance, whether by participating in and putting 
into circulation documentation of the protest event or by performing other resistance actions. 
These can take a variety of forms, ranging from sustained pressure against elected represen­
tatives and governmental bodies to targeted educational campaigns among local communities 
to actively supporting the Palestinian call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against 
Israel until it complies with its obligations under international law.12
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13. The village of Bil‘in has filed a court case against two Canadian companies, Green Park International Inc. and 
Green Mount International Inc. in the Quebec Superior Court in Montreal for violations of international law 
and Canadian domestic law. For more information on the case, see www.bilin-village.org/english/articles/press 
-and-independent-media/Press-Release-Bilin-announced-that-it-has-commenced-legal-proceedings-in-Canada.
By not only representing but also performing the struggle, Bil‘in’s demonstrations are 
intended as a form of political mobilization. Local Palestinians, international and Israeli activ­
ists, political figures, local and international organizations, and various media networks are 
addressed. Among the villages protesting the construction of the Wall on their lands, Bil‘in 
has been critiqued for the media attention it has attracted, which has marginalized the vio­
lence impacting other villages and their struggles. While Bil‘in’s resistance strategy consciously 
acknowledges other villages and other oppressions against the Palestinian people, media 
emphasis on Bil‘in as a symbol of Palestinian resistance tends to remain focused on the sym­
bol, occluding other sites, articulations, and strategies of both Israeli oppression and Palestinian 
resistance. Such media outlets are not limited to the international sphere, but are echoed by the 
Palestinian Authority and their media campaigns. The gradual focalization of the Palestinian 
struggle over the years has been facilitated by Israel and its allies, shifting the frame from the 
colonization and ethnic cleansing of Palestine, to the military occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza strip in 1967 (reassigning Palestine to less than 23 percent of its pre­1948 land), to a state­
orientated project of limited autonomy (under the dictates of the 1993 Oslo Accords), to local­
ized manifestations of Israel’s policing regime, such as checkpoints, settlement expansion in the 
West Bank, and construction of the Wall (see Smith 2007; Beinin and Hajjar n.d.). Each new 
frame narrows the discourse, understanding, and reach of the Palestinian struggle, as it phys­
ically reduces the map of Palestine. Thus, the Palestinian anticolonial liberation struggle has 
been largely reconfigured into a humanitarian struggle of a people distributed over numerous 
enclaves, inside and outside the land of Palestine.
Palestinian strategies of resistance, in their various manifestations, have redefined themselves 
within the changing landscape of oppression against them. Within a context of increasingly glo­
balized forms of oppression and resistance, Bil‘in’s protest demonstrations capitalize on inter­
national and media networks. Targeted campaigns against the companies building the Wall have 
been launched in a number of countries, emphasizing the international role that makes Israeli 
repression possible. A reason for the more recent heightened repression against Bil‘in has been 
attributed to its successful media outreach, which has enabled the pursuance of legal challenges 
to Israeli policies, such as a current case against two Canadian companies filed in a Canadian 
court, in addition to actions in Israeli courts and the International Court of Justice’s ruling.13 In 
accordance with such strategies, the fact that Israeli oppression against the Palestinians has only 
been made possible by international and institutional backing is brought back into the frame.
Role Reversals
In January 2009, during the violent Israeli onslaught on Gaza, Bil‘in villagers and protestors 
wore clothes reminiscent of those worn by Jews in Nazi concentration camps, including yel­
low cut­outs in the shape of Gaza with the word “Gazan.” Just as the villagers appropriated the 
words of the soldier regarding Israeli construction standards for Bil‘in’s Palestinian outpost, 
here the villagers embodied the words of Matan Vilnai, Israel’s Deputy Defense Minister, who 
remarked in February 2008 that the Palestinians risked a “shoah,” the Hebrew word used for 
Holocaust. In the specific context of Israel and Palestine, the protestors’ performance cannot be 
read only as a resignification of the word “holocaust” mimicking Vilnai, but as also pointing to 
the fact that “victim,” like “violence,” cannot be read in any one way. Furthermore, the discom­
fort provoked by the visual referencing of such an atrocity is heightened because of those per­
forming the roles. In such a performance, for instance, how do the Israeli soldiers respond to 
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14. The “role reversal” described is not read as a direct or literal reversal of roles. The complexity of such a perfor-
mance must be analyzed within a network of factors, including but not limited to how the Nazi genocide of the 
Jews has been incorporated into the Zionist project, how the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust have largely been 
treated by Israel historically and discursively, and the percentage of Holocaust survivors in Israel in relation to the 
total number of Jewish citizens of the state.
Palestinian villagers playing the role of Jews during the Nazi Holocaust? At the same time, the 
performance can only be realized because of the protestors’ recognition of the Nazi genocide 
of the Jews in Europe. Unlike the symbolic releasing of Palestinian prisoners from an iron cage 
or the destruction of the polystyrene Wall, how does one confront such a role reversal?14 While 
such a strategy has been enacted more on the discursive level, wherein the Israeli regime and its 
actors are termed “victims­turned­oppressors” or Palestinians termed “the victims’ victims,” the 
physical and visual embodiment of such a reversal forces a different type of confrontation (see 
Said [1979] 1992). Eyad Burnat describes these strategic performances as reversing the dynamic 
where Palestinians are made to respond to Zionist and Israeli colonization practices. Here, the 
Israeli soldiers must now figure out how to respond to the Palestinian villagers’ actions (2009).
While such confrontations focus on the live event of the performance, its resonances direct 
us to both before and after the event itself: what happened before to give reason and meaning to 
such a performance, and what are potential responses to the performance action and its atten­
dant significations. The protest actions of Bil‘in village highlight the roles of its various actors, 
from the Palestinian villagers and Israeli soldiers to the international community, governmen­
tal bodies, and media networks. The performance of their resistance against the Wall is struc­
tured on destabilizing the dynamic of colonizer giving value to event, object, or text. Whether 
by the appropriation of a discourse of nonviolence or the theatricality of protest actions under 
the direction of the villagers, Bil‘in’s strategy of resistance is not about  destabilizing our notions 
Figure 8. The Israeli army lobs tear gas at protestors in Bil‘in, a scene that recurs every Friday. (Photo by 
Friends of Freedom and Justice — Bil‘in)
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of what art is, but rather drawing attention to and questioning our role in the ongoing  spectacle 
of Israeli violence against the Palestinians. The performance is one predicated on a discursive 
strategy of categorizing Bil‘in’s struggle as “nonviolent,” and a theatrical strategy of making vis­
ible not merely the oppression of the Other, but the mechanisms and policies that realize that 
oppression — land confiscation, the imprisonment of thousands of civilians, the implementa­
tion of a closure regime spatially dismembering the viability of any social, economic, or political 
infrastructure, and an ongoing policy of ethnic cleansing.
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